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LEGAL QUALITY of BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 









  This paper has two goals.  The first one is to provide measures of the legal 
quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) in 29 developed and less developed 
countries, using the methodology of Neyapti and Dincer (2005).  The second is to 
investigate the determinants of RS under the hypothesis that the existing institutional 
environment matters for the change of related institutions.  The empirical evidence 
provided here suggests that past financial crises and prevailing levels of FDI and 
financial market development do indeed effect RS beyond and above the effects of 
other likely factors, such as good governance and macroeconomic performance.  
Evidence from transition economies also supports these findings. 
 
 




  North (1990) argues that institutions appear and are sustained adaptively; that 
is, the evolution of institutions occurs due to a network of institutions that provide an 
accommodative environment.  Implantation of some formal rules or mechanisms, on 
the other hand, are often not effective in countries if appropriate market structures and 
supporting institutional mechanisms do not exist.
1  This paper can be considered as a 
test of this argument with an application to financial institutions.2  More specifically, 
we hypothesize that characteristics of the prevailing institutional environment have an 
effect on the quality of the banking laws adopted.     
Neyapti and Dincer (2005)  (henceforth ND) provides measures of the legal 
quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) based on an extensive set of 98 
criteria read from the banking laws of transition economies.  The criteria is grouped 
under 9 main clusters of information regarding: A) capital requirements; B) lending; 
C) ownership structure; D) directors and managers; E) reporting/recording 
requirements; F) corrective action; G) supervision and; H) deposit insurance.   The 
quantification of the above list of criteria is made with the viewpoint of evaluating the 
extent of limiting or eliminating the potential transaction costs or the risks in the 
banking sector.  Summary indices, based on the unweighted averaging and principle 
components analysis, that we generate from this wide-ranging criteria list enable the 
                                                   
1 See, for example, Cukierman et al (2002) and Neyapti and Dincer (forthcoming, 2005) for the 
empirical findings on the adoption of monetary financial or institutions in transition economies. 
2 Posen (1995) argues that effective financial opposition to inflation (measured by “unity of interest in 
price stability and openness of political system to interest group influence) has a positive impact on 
central bank independence.   4 
assessment of the relative positions of countries with regards to legal banking 
reforms.
3   
This paper extents the ND study in two dimensions: first, we adopt the ND 
methodology to measure RS in another set of 29 countries that includes both 
developed and less-developed countries, excluding the set of transition countries 
investigated in ND.  Next, in addition to using deposit insurance (DI) as a component 
of RS as was the case in ND, here we also form a index of RS excluding the DI 
component, as we think that DI deserves a separate attention due to the recent 
emphasis given to it in the literature (see, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2003).  The 
resulting indices of RS also enables us to compare the legal quality of banking sector 
reforms in transition countries with that in a mixed sample of developing and 
developed countries.  Secondly, as different issue from ND, in this paper we 
investigate the determinants of RS.  More specifically, we analyze the effects of 
prevailing financial market development, foreign direct investment (FDI), financial 
crises and governance on the level of RS.   The choice of these variables as possible 
determinants of RS can be explained as follows.  The use of crises is due to the need 
for prudent bank regulation and supervision that became particularly evident after the 
recent Asian financial crises, leading to increasing emphasis given to Basle guidelines 
in the banking sectors of many countries.  Hence, we hypothesize that former 
experience of financial crises also result in the lesson of adopting higher quality RS.  
We also hypothesize that both developed financial markets and good governance 
provide appropriate ground for institutionalizing prudent bank regulation and 
                                                   
3 Using these measures, ND show that, controlling for other relevant factors, RS has had positive 
influence on the growth rates of transition economies.   
   5 
supervision and thus make it the more likely to adopt high legal quality of bank 
regulation and supervision.   
FDI flows are often directed to countries that have favourable market 
conditions that also reflect the potential of a country for institutional reforms, 
including those geared to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the 
banking system.  Hence, the inclusion of FDI in the list of potential determinants of 
RS follows the argument that FDI flows indicate the pre existence of the necessary 
investment infrastructure that, as a part of institutional network, we consider would 
also be highly relevant for the establishment of good quality of RS.  Moreover, the 
reason that we consider EU membership in this list is that it is generally accepted as a 
favorable initial condition that may also lead countries to adopt new legal frameworks 
(see, for example, Cukeirman et al., 2002).   
To sum up, our hypotheses are motivated with the view that adoption of better 
quality of bank regulation and supervision can be partially explained by either crises 
that generate encompassing problems and thus significant lessons for economic better 
management, as in the aftermath of the Asian financial crises; and the presence 
developed financial markets or flow of FDI that are associated with supporting 
institutional infrastructure.  We test these hypotheses both for the sample of 29 
developed and less developed countries, for which new measurements of RS are 
presented in this paper, and for the 23 transition economies covered in ND.  The use 
of two different samples also serves the purpose of a robustness test for our findings.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.    Section 2 reports the new data 
set.  Section 3 explains the methodology and reports the empirical results.  Section 4 
concludes.  
   6 
2. Data and Methodology  
The methodology to evaluate RS follows directly that of ND (2004) and is 
based on the codings of the letter of actual banking laws.  The only difference in the 
methodology from that of ND is that, in this paper, we separate the DI codings as a 
different variable (DI).  Our measure of DI emphasizes restrictiveness cum 
transparency cum coverage aspects as for all the other aspects of RS.  This is as an 
alternative measurement of DI to that provided by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (DH, 
2003).
4  To show the inherent consistency in our codings, via the reinforcing effect of 
such attributes of DI for the rest of RS, we alternatively use RS both including 
(RSwDI) and excluding DI (RSwoDI) in our analysis.   
Hence, for both types of RS, we calculate three indices, namely, the 
unweighted average, and two types of principle components that are explained in 
detail in ND
5.  The codings of RS are such that if a country's banking law is coded as 
1, it satisfies the Basle Guidelines and it also covers additional attributes of banking 
regulation and supervision that are based on the letter of the banking laws.     
Table 1 below reports the list of countries and the dates of the banking laws 
employed in this study, along with the unweighted indices of RSwDI and RSwoDI 
corresponding to each.  For the countries studied, we observe only 4 changes in the 
                                                   
4 DH interpret the variable based on the various properties of DI as the “Moral Hazard Index” (MHI). 
The authors argue that the adoption of deposit scheme involves the trade-off between increased 
depositor safety and reduced market discipline on banks. Here, however, we consider the deposit 
insurance as contributing to the quality of bank regulation and supervision.  Although our index and 
DH index are similar to each other, there is a main difference on the management of the deposit 
insurance fund. We support that private management increases the quality whereas, in DH index, 
official management is preferred. Furthermore, the coverage of our index is wider. Better coordination 
between the management of DI and the CB, better coordination between the management of DI and 
bank supervisor, the quicker payments to depositors, and full coverage during crises are the criteria that 
increase the quality of deposit insurance in our index. 
5 the two types of principle components (PC) are formed as follows: i), by calculating PCs based on all 
of the 98 criteria, ii) first by calculating the PCs for each of the 9 sub-criteria groups, and then 
calculating the PCs based on the resulting number of PCs calculated in the first step.     7 
banking laws, namely for Brazil, Indonesia, UK and Turkey, which increase the 
number of (panel) observations to 33.   
 
Table 1. Unweighted Indices of RS 
Country   Year of 
Enactment 
RSwDI  RSwoDI 
 
of the Banking 
Law 
   
       
Developed Countries    0.36  0.35 
Germany  1993  0.59  0.58 
Portugal  1992  0.51  0.49 
Luxemburg  1993  0.41  0.37 
Denmark  1996  0.39  0.44 
Finland  1997  0.37  0.34 
Netherlands  1992  0.34  0.38 
England (2)  1987  0.32  0.28 
Belgium  1993  0.31  0.29 
France  1984  0.31  0.33 
Greece  1993  0.28  0.31 
Spain  1988  0.28  0.23 
England (1)  1979  0.27  0.23 
Switzerland  1934  0.24  0.28 
       
Less-developed Countries    0.28  0.29 
Turkey (2)  1999  0.49  0.48 
Hong Kong  1997  0.39  0.45 
Turkey (1)  1985  0.38  0.37 
Kenya  1995  0.36  0.36 
Egypt  1957  0.35  0.37 
Singapore  1994  0.35  0.4 
Lebanon  1963  0.33  0.29 
Philippines  1948  0.31  0.26 
Malaysia  1989  0.29  0.33 
Pakistan  1962  0.27  0.31 
Sri Lanka  1988  0.27  0.31 
Argentina  1977  0.24  0.18 
Korea  1998  0.23  0.26 
South Africa  1990  0.23  0.26 
Kuwait  1968  0.22  0.26 
Brazil (2)  1974  0.21  0.24 
Tunisia  1967  0.2  0.23 
Brazil (1)  1964  0.17  0.19 
Indonesia (1)  1967  0.13  0.15 
Indonesia (2)  1992  0.13  0.14 
 
Inspecting RS values reported in Table 1 reveals some interesting points. That 
Germany receives the highest ranking (RS) may suggest that it follows the Basle 
Guidelines more closely than the rest of the countries in the sample.  Following 
Germany, ranks the Portuguese law dated 1992 and the Turkish law dated 1999.  We   8 
also observe that all the laws that are later revised (namely of Turkey, England and 
Brazil) reflect higher values for RS than the earlier ones, except for a slight 
deterioration in the codings of Indonesia from 1967 to 1992.
6   
The sample in Table 1 yields 0.31 for the average value for the RSwDI index, 
which is much higher than the average of 0.19 based on 26 observations obtained for 
RS (the comparable index) the transition countries.  Also, Table1 shows that 
developed countries, on average, has a higher RS than less developed countries, where 
the difference is especially notable with regards to RSwDI.  When focused on 1990s 
only, the whole sample also yields an average of 0.36, which is the same as the 
developed countries’ average.  Interestingly, the only 3 countries in the current sample 
that have had less than the average of 0.36 RSwDI in the 1990s, namely South Africa, 
Korea and Indonesia, all have had financial crises in the 1990s
7.  We also observe that 
the correlation between RswDI and RSwoDI is very high: 0.94.   
Appendix 1 reports the principle components of both RSwDI and RSwoDI.  In 
addition, Appendix 2 reports the correlations between the principle components and 
the unweighted indices of RSwDI and RSwoDI.  That the correlations between both 
types of RS and their (first) principle components are very high (more than 74%) 
justifies that we only employ the unweighted averages method in the rest of the paper.  
Moreover, the relationship between the 9 main components of RS and the main 
principle components, constructed by various methods
8 do not indicate any specific 
clustering of the codings such that we could classify the individual principle 
components in any specific way.  This and our concern about degrees of freedom are 
                                                   
6 UK has revised its banking law also in 2000 
7 see Caprio and Klingebiel 1999. 
8 The two explained above which are both formed based on correlation and covariance methods built-in 
the E-Views econometrics package.   9 
the other reasons for using the unweighted indices of RS to represent all of its 
components.     
Table 2 lists the average values of the 9 components of RS across transition 
countries and our current mixed sample.  Developed countries appear to have 
especially better quality with regards to the provisions about ownership structure; 
directors and managers; reporting, recording requirements and supervision.  On the 
other hand, less-developed countries on average appear to have stricter provisions for 
deposit insurance and corrective action.  The table reveals that legal provisions 
regarding DI are much less restrictive in transition economies than in both developed 
and less developed countries.  This is explainable on the grounds that greater coverage 
and less inhibited DI was a need during the reform period of transition economies, as 
would be the case in any crises period.  Moreover, it appears that legal RS in 
transition economies has significantly lagged behind developed countries with regards 
to any group of criteria.  
Table 2. Comparison of 9 components between different samples 
  Developed   Less-developed  Transition 
A. Capital Requirements  0.41  0.41  0.37 
B. Lending  0.06  0.18  0.06 
C. Ownership Structure  0.25  0.13  0.13 
D. Directors and Managers  0.23  0.19  0.13 
E. Reporting/Recording      
Requirements  0.48  0.35  0.37 
F. Corrective Action  0.49  0.57  0.32 
G. Supervision  0.46  0.28  0.16 
H. Deposit Insurance  0.68  0.84  0.10 
 
3. What Determines RS? 
  In this section, we test the hypothesis that the prevailing circumstances of the 
economy when the banking law was enacted, namely, banking crises; indicators of 
FMD; governance; FDI flows; and the EU membership, all affect the quality of RS.    10 
The analysis in the paper can be characterized as an event study based on data for 29 
countries, where we look at 10 year averages of the relevant variables before the date 
of changes in banking laws.  All the estimations below are carried out by robust-errors 
technique that corrects for heterogeneity across countries.   
 For the indicators of financial market development (FMD), we use the share 
of credit going to the private sector in GDP (CRprvtGDP), the size of the banking 
sector as compared to GDP (CRGDP) and M2 to GDP ratio (M2GDP).  We also 
employ FDI to GDP ratio (FDIGDP) so as to account for the presence of initial 
conditions conducive to investment.  All the data, including various measures of 
governance
9, are obtained from the World Bank web-sites.  Data on financial crises 
(CRISES) are based on Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), which we expressed as 
percentage of the time period that coincided with crises.  Similarly, we express EU 
membership as percentage of the time period considered that covers the membership 
period.  The data are reported in Appendix 3. 
In what follows, we sequentially investigate the effect of each of these 
variables on RS (measured by RSwDI).  The first three columns of Table 3a shows 
the relationship between RS and the values of the three alternative measures of FMD 
(CRGDP; CRprvtGDP and M2GDP) besides its relationship with EU membership in 
the period preceding the enactment of banking laws.  In all these regressions, we 
observe that FMD as well as EU membership matters for the quality of RS.   
Next, we consider the possibility that countries that have gone through 
significant banking crises decide to adopt, or are imposed to adopt by donor countries 
or institutions that finance recovery, higher quality RS.  To test this hypothesis, we 
add the variable CRISES, which measures for the ratio of the period covered in this   11 
study that was in crises, in all these three regressions.  The results indicate that not 
only that previous crises are significant in affecting strong legal bank reforms, but 
also its inclusion significantly improves the overall goodness of fit of the regressions. 
 
Table 3a. Determinants of RSwDI 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
              Constant  0.23  0.18  0.23  0.20  0.18  0.18 
  (8.10)***  (6.91)***  (6.82)***  (10.41)***  (8.19)***  (10.26)*** 
EU Mem.  0.10  0.07  0.10  0.12  0.09  0.12 
  (2.77)***  (1.66)*  (5.36)***  (3.47)***  (2.52)**  (10.84)*** 
CRISES        0.17  0.12  0.25 
        (2.64)***  (2.52)**  (6.45)*** 
CRprvtGDP  0.00      0.00     
  (3.26)***      (4.01)***     
CRGDP    0.00      0.00   
    (4.20)***      (5.00)***   
M2GDP      0.00      0.00 
      (3.50)***      (5.98)*** 
             
D. Freedom  26  25  14  25  24  13 
R-bar2  0.29  0.42  0.14  0.45  0.49  0.75 
Notes:  In parentheses under each coefficient are the t-ratios. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
Table 3b shows the same regressions as in Table 3a, with the exception that 
the dependent variable is RSwoDI.  As was indicated earlier, a comparison of the 
goodness of fits of the last 3 regressions in Tables 3a and 3b indicate that the 
inclusion of DI into the measurement of RS may indeed be providing a reinforcing 
effect when CRISES is taken into account.  Having separately observed the positive 
effect of CRISES on DI
10, we can argue that, unlike in Table 3a, that CRISES is not 
significant in Table 3b reveals that the positive linkage between DI offered during 
crises may be captured in the positive coefficient of CRISES in Table 3a.  The rest of 
the results are very similar across the two tables.     
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Governance measures of political stability (POLSTAB), corruption control (CORR), government 
efficiency (GOVEFF) and rule of law (RULE) are all obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2003)    12 
Table 3b. Determinants of RSwoDI 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
              Constant  0.24***  0.19***  0.23***  0.22***  0.19***  0.19*** 
  (8.48)  (6.86)  (7.42)  (9.59)  (7.23)  (9.68) 
EU Mem.  0.08**  0.05  0.12***  0.09***  0.06  0.15*** 
  (2.07)  (1.14)  (7.11)  (2.48)  (1.43)  (10.57) 
CRISES        0.12  0.06  0.22*** 
        (1.54)  (0.96)  (5.99) 
CRprvtGDP  0.00***      0.01***     
  (3.63)      (3.81)     
CRGDP    0.00***      0.00***   
    (4.69)      (4.74)   
M2GDP      0.00***      0.00*** 
      (4.42)      (5.92) 
             
D. Freedom  26  25  14  25  24  13 
R-bar
2  0.29  0.41  0.32  0.36  0.40  0.73 
Notes:  In parentheses under each coefficient are the t-ratios. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
In Table 4, we explore the impact of FDIGDP on RSwDI.  However, we have 
to note that the lack of information on FDI (see Appendix 3) limits the number of 
observations in a substantial manner.  Hence, we analyze the effect of FDI on RS 
separate than that of FMD.  In addition to data limitations, we justify this separation 
due to the very high correlations between FDIGDP and the two FMD measures, 
namely M2GDP and CRprvtGDP (see Appendix 4).    
Table 4 indicates that, similar to FMD, FDI also has significant positive 
impact on RS, along with the EU membership and CRISES variables.  In the first 
column, we thus test the hypothesis that favorable initial conditions, such as EU 
membership and FDI flows into a country may be conducive to the adoption of 
greater quality RS.  Indeed, we observe that both EU membership and FDIGDP are 
significantly positive at 5% levels for RSwoDI, though FDIGDP is not significant for 
RSwDI.  Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 report the results with the addition of CRISES 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 We regressed DI on FDIGDP, CRISES and EU membership and observed that the first is negatively   13 
variable, which notably improve the estimation results.  The findings indicate that 
indeed the presence of crises significantly contribute to the quality of RS in the 
decade that follows.  Moreover, after controlling for CRISES, FDIGDP also becomes 
significant for RSwDI. 
Table 4. Determinants of RS 
  RSwDI    RSwoDI 
  I  II    I  II 
            Constant  0.29***  0.24***    0.28***  0.24*** 
  (9.82)  (10.06)    (9.56)  (9.33) 
EU Mem.  0.10*  0.14***    0.10**  0.14*** 
  (1.90)  (2.89)    (1.98)  (2.75) 
CRISES    0.16***      0.13* 
    (2.63)      (1.80) 
FDIGDP  0.00  0.01**    0.01**  0.01*** 
  (0.62)  (2.41)    (1.96)  (3.51) 
           
D. Freedom  18  17    18  17 
R-bar
2  0.08  0.25    0.10  0.20 
Notes:  In parentheses under each coefficient are the t-ratios. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
We also added measures of governance (POLINS, GOVEFF, RULE and 
CORR) into our determinants list for RS, along with both FMD variables and 
FDIGDP, and observed that neither of these measures improves the results and their 
coefficients are insignificant.
11  This result indicates that the variables reported in 
Tables 3 and 4 already capture the conditions under which good governance operates; 
indeed, excluding some of the control variables lead to significant coefficients for the 
governance variables supporting this argument.   
Finally, we added macroeconomic fundamentals, namely, inflation, GDP 
growth and openness to the list of explanatory variables (not reported)12.  However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the second is positively significant for DI. 
11 We observe in Appendix 4 all governance indicators are highly correlated with EU membership and 
especially with the FMD indicators: M2 to GDP and  private credit to GDP ratios.  
12 These results are available from the author upon request.   14 
we note that while the first two variables are highly correlated (at around 50%) with 
both EU membership and FDIGDP, the last one is very highly (over 90%) correlated 
with FDIGDP.  Hence, the resulting regression model reduces the significance of 
former results and the added variables are themselves found insignificant, due 
possibly to high multicolinearity among the explanatory variables.   
Transition countries: 
We compare the results obtained here with those in transition economies that 
were reported in ND.  Due to data limitations in transition set, instead of financial 
market development indicators and FDI, we instead use cumulative liberalization 
index (CLI)13.   
The regression results reported in Table 5 indicate that, as in the current data 
set, presence of financial crises prior to the enactment of banking laws as well as the 
median cumulative liberalization index prior to the enactment of banking laws are 
positively affecting the quality of RS in transition economies.  Both of these results 
closely parallel the above results.   
            Table 5. Determinants of RS in Transition Economies 
  I  II 
      Constant  0.11***  -0.00 
  (4.48)  (-0.05)  
Initial CLI  0.03***  0.02** 
  (3.10)  (2.40) 
Initial GDP    0.02 
    (1.28) 
Lagged Crises  0.07**  0.07** 
  (2.18)  (2.22) 
R-bar
2  0.29  0.29 
Notes:  In parentheses under each coefficient are the t-ratios. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
                                                   
13 De Melo et al (1996) measure CLI based on the indices of internal and external price liberalization 
and other market reforms including privatization, which are all reported cumulatively over time.   15 
4. Conclusions 
  Following the methodology of Neyapti and Dincer (2004), this study presents 
new evidence on the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision in a new set of 
countries that involve developed and less developed countries, excluding transition 
economies.  The new evidence shows that, on average, RS in developed countries 
tend to be greater than that in both less developed countries and transition economies.   
In addition, panel analysis reveals that prevailing financial crises, financial 
market development, FDI and EU membership all positively affect RS.  We find 
further support for these findings in transition country sample as well. 
The policy implication emerging from this study is that quality of RS may 
increase with the lessons derived from crises, but improving financial markets and 
policies that also encourage FDI also appear to contribute to the legal quality of RS 
that would, in turn, contribute to sustaining conditions for institutional and economic 
development.     16 
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Appendix 1. Unweighted Indices of Regulation and Indices 
 
Banking Laws  RSwDI    RSwoDI 
  Pa1  Pa2  Pb1  Pb2    Pa1  Pa2  Pb1 
                 
Argentina-1977  -1.22  1.13  -0.83  -0.48    -1.31  -0.09  -1.28 
Belgium-1993  0.42  0.75  -1.69  1.28    0.21  1.81  0.27 
Brazil-1964  -2.73  -0.68  -3.84  -1.21    -2.56  -0.38  -2.56 
Brazil-1974  -2.34  -0.71  -2.18  -0.99    -2.16  -0.52  -2.16 
Denmark-1996  1.59  -1.24  1.16  0.88    1.82  0.87  1.84 
Egypt-1957  0.74  -0.87  1.05  -1.71    0.83  -0.75  0.79 
England-1979  -1.62  2.32  -1.16  1.96    -1.99  0.77  -1.96 
England-1987  -1.57  2.41  -2.12  1.59    -2.00  1.08  -2.02 
Finland-1997  2.15  0.77  2.33  1.27    1.81  -0.42  1.80 
France-1984  0.72  -1.18  -0.86  0.26    0.86  1.03  0.87 
Germany-1993  3.14  1.62  3.06  3.29    2.73  0.77  2.65 
Greece-1993  -0.91  -0.02  -1.05  2.36    -0.95  1.36  -0.97 
Hong Kong-1997  1.39  -1.31  3.23  -2.35    1.66  -1.66  1.60 
Indonesia-1967  -1.74  -0.56  -1.69  0.41    -1.61  -0.15  -1.52 
Indonesia-1992  -1.69  -0.53  -1.07  -0.19    -1.60  -0.53  -1.50 
Kenya-1995  0.84  -0.28  1.62  -0.57    0.90  -1.18  0.94 
Korea-1998  -1.53  -1.07  -0.55  -2.21    -1.30  -1.93  -1.29 
Kuwait-1968  -0.73  -1.03  -0.79  -0.88    -0.51  -0.67  -0.51 
Lebanon-1963  -0.74  0.97  -0.63  -0.60    -0.86  -1.65  -0.82 
Luxemburg-1993  0.71  2.36  0.34  2.69    0.24  2.17  0.16 
Malaysia-1989  0.89  -1.67  0.81  -1.69    1.23  -0.25  1.20 
Netherlands-1992  1.15  -1.05  -0.03  0.75    1.28  2.03  1.26 
Pakistan-1962  0.48  -1.52  0.94  -0.01    0.78  -0.03  0.81 
Philippines-1948  -1.53  2.39  0.35  2.57    -1.90  0.08  -1.95 
Portugal-1992  2.13  1.61  1.08  0.32    1.89  -0.03  1.85 
Singapore-1994  0.91  -1.68  0.55  -2.52    1.25  -1.06  1.26 
South Africa-1990  -0.68  -0.92  -1.41  -0.63    -0.48  0.28  -0.56 
Spain-1988  -0.40  1.96  -0.87  1.21    -0.74  1.20  -0.69 
Sri Lanka-1988  -0.09  -1.26  -0.66  -1.56    0.18  0.71  0.17 
Switzerland-1934  0.48  -1.27  -0.06  -0.70    0.73  0.30  0.74 
Tunisia-1967  -0.91  -1.36  -0.76  -0.98    -0.63  0.02  -0.56 
Turkey-1985  0.53  0.52  1.45  -1.19    0.40  -1.95  0.43 

















   18 
Appendix 2a: Correlations among RSwoDI and its principle components. 
  Pa1  Pa2    Pb1 
A. Capital Requirements  0.4  -0.3    0.4* 
B. Lending  0.3  -0.7*    0.3 
C. Ownership Structure  0.6*  0.2    0.6* 
D. Directors and Managers  0.1  0.2    0.1 
E. Reporting/Recording 
Requirements  0.8*  0.3    0.8* 
F. Corrective Action  0.4  -0.2    0.4 
G. Supervision  0.8*  0.4*    0.8* 
RSwoDI  0.9*  0.0    0.8* 





Appendix 2b: Correlations among RSwDI and its principle components. 
  Pa1  Pa2    Pb1  Pb2 
A. Capital Requirements  0.5*  0.1    0.6*  0.1 
B. Lending  0.3  0.0    0.5*  -0.3 
C. Ownership Structure  0.7*  0.1    0.6*  0.2 
D. Directors and Managers  0.1  0.3    0.0  0.1 
E. Reporting/Recording 
Requirements  0.8*  -0.1    0.5*  0.1 
F. Corrective Action  0.4  -0.1    0.6*  -0.1 
G. Supervision  0.8*  0.0    0.4  0.2 
H. Deposit Insurance  0.2  0.9*    0.2  0.6* 
RSwDI  0.8  0.4    0.8  0.3 
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Appendix 3. Data used in the study 
 
Banking Laws  CRprvt
GDP 
CRGDP  M2GDP  FDIGDP  Rule of 
Law 
Corr.  Polins  Govn. 
Eff. 
                 
Argentina-1977  16.69  24.96  17.38  0.05  0.22  -0.36  0.55  0.18 
Belgium-1993  7.46  83.20  -  1.31  1.34  1.05  0.87  1.29 
Brazil-1964  16.83  26.42  17.28  -  -0.26  -0.02  0.47  -0.27 
Brazil-1974  28.58  33.43  16.38  1.22  -0.26  -0.02  0.47  -0.27 
Denmark-1996  42.01  59.61  57.76  1.15  1.71  2.09  1.34  1.62 
Egypt-1957  -  -  -  -  0.21  -0.16  0.21  0.27 
England-1979  28.46  47.52  -  1.42  1.61  1.86  1.1  1.77 
England-1987  45.58  54.25  -  1.28  1.61  1.86  1.1  1.77 
Finland-1997  76.04  75.74  -  0.76  1.83  2.25  1.61  1.67 
France-1984  90.54  103.23  -  0.41  1.22  1.15  1.04  1.24 
Germany-1993  86.17  100.97  -  0.16  1.57  1.38  1.21  1.67 
Greece-1993  37.78  94.19  -  1.16  0.62  0.73  0.79  0.65 
Hong Kong-1997  152.92  145.08  162.40  -  1.37  1.16  1.13  1.1 
Indonesia-1967  3.36  29.88  4.02  -  -0.87  -1.01  -1.56  -0.5 
Indonesia-1992  29.18  28.17  26.56  0.64  -0.87  -1.01  -1.56  -0.5 
Kenya-1995  32.04  52.27  31.06  0.32  -1.21  -1.11  -0.83  -0.76 
Korea-1998  68.83  -  -  0.49  0.55  0.37  0.5  0.44 
Kuwait-1968  9.74  4.04  29.76  -  1.1  0.59  0.64  0.13 
Lebanon-1963  -  -  -  -  -0.05  -0.63  -0.55  -0.02 
Luxemburg-1993  108.86  109.36  -  -  1.86  1.78  1.48  1.86 
Malaysia-1989  72.13  101.55  58.38  3.18  0.34  0.13  0.31  0.53 
Netherlands-1992  80.82  112.34  -  1.93  1.67  2.09  1.48  1.84 
Pakistan-1962  13.02  36.43  36.47  -  -0.74  -0.79  -0.39  -0.48 
Philippines-1948  -  -  -  -  -0.49  -0.49  -0.21  0.03 
Portugal-1992  61.86  87.37  -  1.80  0.94  1.21  1.41  0.91 
Singapore-1994  99.11  80.73  81.70  10.51  1.85  2.13  1.44  2.16 
South Africa-1990  71.37  91.83  50.40  -  -0.05  0.35  0.07  0.25 
Spain-1988  66.72  91.82  na  1.12  1.12  1.45  1.01  1.57 
Sri Lanka-1988  20.10  43.16  28.48  0.86  -0.31  0  -1.63  -0.44 
Switzerland-1934  -  -  -  -  1.91  1.91  1.61  1.93 
Tunisia-1967  28.42  40.88  30.07  -  0.81  0.86  0.82  1.3 
Turkey-1985  17.54  43.76  18.77  0.09  -0.16  -0.48  -0.75  -0.15 
Turkey-1999  19.90  121.42  25.42  0.46  -0.16  -0.48  -0.75  -0.15 
 
 Appendix 4. Correlations Among Variables  
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